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Our agricultural technology and trade patterns have 
reached the point where an adequate agricultural 
transportation system is absolutely essential for farm 
prosperity in the Upper Midwest. 
Our cash grain farms increasingly require reliable 
access to international markets. About one-third of 
our corn and two-thirds of our wheat is typically 
exported. If we can't move this grain into export 
channels-either because we don't have the transpor-
tation facilities or because high transportation costs 
make our grain non-competitive in international 
markets-returns per acre will decrease, marginal land 
will come out of production, and the value of the 
remaining land will decrease. 
During the 1970s, transportation became a major 
contributor to the cost of production as agriculture 
depended more on off-farm inputs and as energy 
prices rose. Transportation's share of total production 
cost will continue to grow during the 1980s. 
THREE CHARACTERISTICS 
Location 
Upper Midwest farm products are especially vulner-
able to transportation short-falls. Because we are the 
farthest from the oceans and the deepwater ports, we 
are the last to prosper and the first to be hurt during 
swings in export demand. Consequently, we have to 
be ready to ship to where the markets are located. We 
must have alternative outlets. We must be able to ship 
to the Gulf of Mexico, through the St. Lawrence Sea-
way, and move by rail to the West Coast or even the 
East Coast. 
Because of our location, the transportation system 
serving the Upper Midwest must be flexible. We must 
be able to respond efficiently to shifts in international 
demand for farm products. Some policy-makers, how-
ever, consider maintenance of two or three outlets for 
our products as redundant and wasteful. They tend to 
view vital transportation links in terms of a single 
road or railroad between a parts manufacturer and an 
assembly plant, or between a mine and a power plant. 
They ask us why we need both the railroad to the 
West Coast and the lock and dam system to the Gulf. 
If, like a power plant,. we knew where our cus-
tomers would be located for the next 20 years, we 
might not need such flexibility. During the late 70s, 
agriculture's growth market was the Soviet Union. 
Most of that market was being supplied through the 
Gulf ports oi· out the Seaway. In 1980, however, our 
growth market seemed to shift to the Pacific Rim 
countries, requiring a West Coast outlet. 
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Upper Midwest agriculture cannot let itself be 
short-changed in national transportation planning. 
Our transportation situation is different from that of 
the industrial economy. 
Infrastructure Deterioration 
We must reverse the 1970s trend of moving from 
one transportation crisis to another, with each worse 
than the one before. The increasing severity of these 
crises is primarily due to the fact that we have not 
been replacing or repairing the transportation infra-
structure-roads, railroads, railroad classification 
yards, and waterway improvements-as fast as we 
wear them out or they become obsolete. 
Since the early 70s, we have not invested enough in 
the transportation system to replace existing facilities, 
much less meet the expanded demand created by the 
farm export boom. This is a new phenomena in U.S. 
transportation policy. 
Since the formation of the republic, our leaders 
have recognized the need for improved transportation 
as a means to promote commerce and our economic 
well-being. Enormous resources, public and private, A 
were devoted to development of the transportation W 
infrastructure. In the early 1800s, Congress appropri-
ated $6.8 million for the National Pike to run from 
Cumberland, Maryland, to St. Louis on what was 
then the western boundary of the United States. 
From 1820 to 1840 the states spent about $200 
million on canal construction. This included the 
enormously successful Erie Canal which cost $7 
million and provided the major impetus for settling 
the Old Midwest. 
Next came the railroad building era, which gener-
ally spanned the period from the Civil War until the 
early 1900 's. By the era's end, the average farm in the 
Corn belt was only 7 miles from a railstop-not a rail-
road, but a railstop. 
During the 1920s and 30s we built rural roads and 
the old federal primary road system. In the 30s we 
built most of the locks and dams on the Mississippi 
River. During the 50s and 60s we constructed the in-
terstate highway system and opened the St. Lawrence 
Seaway. We increased transportation capacity every 
year for 150 years, except in wartime. 
Recently, however, this annual increase has been 
reversed by inflation, project delays and cancellations 
for environmental reasons, political pressures for mass 
transit, and indecision over what to do for failing 
railroads. 
We must also be aware of technological obsoles- A 
cence and locational developments that reduce our W 
real transportation capacity. A good example is the 
location of railyards in downtown areas. These may 
--
have been ideal locations when the railroads were 
constructed in the 1880s, but not now. Obsolete yard 
locations frequently force trains to go through con-
gested cities, slowing movements and lowering rail 
productivity. In order to maintain the infrastructure 
we must start investing more in fixed transportation 
facilities. 
A System 
Upper Midwest agricultural transportation is a 
system made up of many individual, but related, parts. 
These parts are generally controlled by separate enti-
ties whose goals may be in conflict. Minimizing the 
costs of one part of the system may increase costs 
elsewhere, and in fact it may increase total transpor-
tation costs. What's best for an individual might not 
be very good for the rest of the system. For example: 
• Long truck lines at terminal elevators. The cost of 
waiting is put on the trucker or shipper. It could be 
solved by more dumps or storage. Then terminal 
costs would go up. 
• Overweight trucks. Carrying an increased payload 
could result in lower unit costs to the shipper. Then 
the public has to pay a road damage bill that ex-
ceeds transport savings. 
Because of the interrelation of the system's parts, a 
failure in one part may manifest itself elsewhere by 
delays, increased costs, or other problems. Our so-
called rail equipment shortages are frequently not 
shortages, but symptoms of system breakdown that 
cause poor equipment utilization. If we were to get the 
same kind of turn-around in rail hopper cars that we 
did in 1972-about 18 trips per year--our recent car 
shortages would have been much less severe. Other 
parts of the system had the following problems: 
• Slow orders due to poor track. In some parts of the 
rail system, the condition of the railbed limits train 
speeds to 10 or 15 miles per hour on routes where 
speeds of 30 to 40 miles per hour would have been 
possible with well-maintained tracks. 
• Shortage of locomotive power. The cars are filled 
with grain, but occasionally there are no locomo-
tives in working condition to pull them. 
• Poor turn-around at ports. We embargo the ports 
of New Orleans or Houston when the backlog of 
loaded grain cars in the port area reaches 5,000. No 
more grain cars may be shipped to that port area 
until the cars are unloaded. Those 5,000 grain cars 
make up between 7 and 8 percent of our grain car 
fleet. Supplying more cars in the countryside 
would just mean that more $40,000 hopper cars 
would be used for storage on a siding somewhere, 
until the problems at ports are solved. 
THE ISSUES 
The primary issues involve the financing of the 
physical infrastructure of the transportation modes-
rail, highway, and waterway. 
Deregulation 
Deregulation or reregulation are part of the financ-
ing issue, but will not solve overall problems on their 
own. Nor will they cause the disasters that opponents 
of deregulation are forecasting. On balance, agricul-
ture probably benefits from deregulation. In some 
instances, increased rate-setting freedom for the rail-
roads is likely to lead to improved and more reliable 
rail service, although costs are likely to increase for 
captive shippers. 
Under conditions of less rate regulation, rates will 
be increased for rail captive shippers because they 
cannot use the threat of switching to another mode 
to hold down rates. Grain and fertilizer shippers lo-
cated too far from water outlets would be considered 
rail captive shippers, for instance. 
Another group which may experience disadvantages 
are the small shippers of commodities for which the 
railroads contract service. The negotiating power of 
large shippers might be such that their contract terms 
are much better than those given to small shippers. 
The Rural Transportation Advisory Task Force* 
made several recommendations to avoid or minimize 
*The Rural Transportation Advisory Task Force was established 
by Congress to provide recommendations for determining 
essential agricultural transportation needs and for meeting 
those needs. It was made up of representatives from the agri-
cultural, transportation, and academic communities. Its find-
ings were published January, 1980, in its full report to Congress: 
Agricultural Transportation Services: Needs, Problems, Oppor-
tunities. The report is available from USDA's Office of Trans-
portation. 
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this problem including the establishment of a mini-
mum percentage of cars available for small shippers, 
regulated contracts for shippers unable to negotiate 
terms, and programs to assist small shippers in negoti-
ating contracts. These devices, however, are unproven. 
In general, trucking deregulation will improve the 
situation for both agricultural shippers and truckers. 
The agricultural exemption has been broadened 
slightly, backhauls will be easier to obtain for owner-
operators, exempt and regulated comodities can be 
carried in the same vehicle, and a number of other 
owner-operator problems were addressed in the Motor 
Carrier Act of 1980. 
Rail Revitalization-Who will Pay? 
Massive amounts of funds must be committed 
during the 80s to rebuild our railroad system. This 
rebuilding includes key lines and new or relocated 
yard and terminal facilities. Priority must be given to 
projects which will improve operations and lower 
costs. In other words, we should not rebuild every 
branchline. Nor should we maintain excess mainline 
mileage. 
(Excess mileage includes not only low density 
branchlines, but also mainlines where several railroads 
serve the same routes and cities. There are four main-
lines between Minneapolis and Chicago, for instance. 
We could allow the railroads to abandon every branch-
line they wanted to abandon, and those companies in 
financial difficulty would continue to have financial 
problems due to excess mileage.) 
Funds to rebuild priority lines will probably have 
to be public funds. Most railroads do not generate 
enough cash flow to maintain the quality of roadbeds 
and service levels this country needs. Railroads cannot 
compete with trucks for much of the new industrial 
traffic regardless of their rate levels. Trucks have the 
advantage for many kinds of freight because the rail-
roads have to pay for new facilities as they are con-
structed. They have to pay cash up front from loans 
or current earnings. Railroads generally serve the old 
center cities and warehouse districts, but new manu-
facturing plants are frequently constructed in the 
suburbs or the countryside. 
For instance, a new plant goes in two miles from a 
highway. By the time it is completed a new highway 
is constructed, financed by tax revenues, on an 
existing right-of-way. Even if we assume that truck 
taxes will pay for the road, this is the same as an 
interest-free loan to the trucking firms. Truckers do 
not have to be concerned with acquiring a right-of-
way, constructing the road, or making the bond pay-
ments during poor times. As a result, truckers get the 
shipments and the railroads are locked out of business 
that might have been profitable to them. 
In most cases, deregulation and contract rates will 
not help generate the cash flow the railroads need to 
finance improvements. Where effective truck or water 
competition exists, rail rates cannot be raised. Rate-
setting freedom will increase revenues only if the rail-
roads can raise their rates and stay below the rates of 
competitive modes-an unlikely situation. 
In general, the rails have been losing business 
because their rates are too high for the service they 
can provide. As a result, the only solution is increased 
public expenditure on railroad right-of-ways so that 
service can be improved and rail movements can 
become competitive. 
Water Improvement Needs 
Water transportation in the Upper Midwest depends 
on three waterways-the Mississippi River and its ma-
jor tributaries, the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence 
Seaway, and the Columbia-Snake outlet to the Pacific 
Ocean (figure 1). Water transport costs about one-
fourth to one-half as much as rail, and much less than 
truck transport. Waterway energy consumption per 
ton-mile is generally less than that of rail. 
Waterway issues include whether or at what level 
user charges should be imposed on commercial navi-
gation, whether or not specific expansion projects 
should be undertaken, and various environmental 
disputes. 
Specifically, the construction or expedited con-
struction of a new Lock and Dam 26 on the Missis-
sippi River at Alton, Illinois, remains an issue. The 
current locking facility has been operating at or near 
its capacity since 1976. The average waiting time for 
a tow to be locked through the main chamber during 
the 9-month, April-December 1978 shipping season 
was over 18 hours. During November 1979, the 
average wait was 33 hours. Figure 1 shows its location 
below the confluence of the Upper Mississippi and 
the Illinois Rivers. This lock has the same dimensions 
as the other locks on each river. It handles about 
twice as much traffic, however, since the rivers carry 
about equal amounts of traffic. 
In 1978 a total of 62 million tons of cargo passed 
through Lock and Dam 26. Of that total, 33 million 
tons were down bound grain, which is about 7 5 per-
cent of all the grain shipped on the Mississippi River 
system. Current construction plans indicate it will be 
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Figure 1. Waterways serving Upper Midwest agriculture 
A-- Columbia-Snake River Waterway 
C B - St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Waterway -- Mississippi Waterway 
8 years before the new facility is completed and 10 
years before its capacity will be significantly increased. 
Barge shipments of grain from the northern areas 
through Upper Mississippi ports will likely increase in 
the next few years, even though the total tonnage 
through Lock and Dam 26 cannot increase. Increases 
from the northern part of the river will be possible be-
cause the expense of long waits at the lock will cause 
shippers in areas such as southern Iowa to use trucks 
and rails. The increased cost of rail over barge will 
generally be less if the distance is less. However, the 
resulting transportation costs will be higher for all 
shippers as the northern shippers bear the cost of long 
waits at Alton and southern shippers bear higher 
truck/rail costs. 
Similarly, barge grain may be displaced from the 
Illinois River and trucked to Great Lakes ports. This 
will increase volume on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence 
Seaway and cause that artery to reach capacity sooner 
than expected, raising costs to those who have tradi-
tionally exported through Duluth-Superior and other 
Great Lakes outlets. 
B 
The construction of the new Lock and Dam 26 
should be expedited. It was delayed primarily because 
of the debate on user charges for river traffic, and en-
vironmental concerns. Historically, all construction 
and maintenance by the Army Corps of Engineers on 
the river has been publicly funded . The barge industry, 
unlike rail and to some extent trucks, has not had to 
bear the cost of maintaining its way. This issue has 
been temporarily resolved with the imposition of a 
tax on fuel for commercial navigation. This tax started 
Oct. 1, 1980, at 4 cents per gallon and will increase in 
steps to 10 cents per gallon ai 1985. A tax of this size 
increases costs somewhat, but will not have any major 
effect on the quantities of grain and fertilizer moved 
or on Upper Midwest agriculture in general. However, 
the railroads and others are continuing to push for 
what is called "full recovery" of public navigation ex-
penditures. This would mean a fuel tax of over 60 
cents per gallon. Such a fuel tax would cause major 
changes in grain and fertilizer flows, changes in our 
production patterns, and would deal a blow to farm 
income. 
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The environmental concerns were probably over-
stated by opponents of Lock and Dam 26 and height-
ened by poor public relations and conflicting state-
ments from the Corps of Engineers. The serious 
environmental issues should be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. Dredging, for example, is not always 
harmful to the environment. In some locations the 
dredge material is uncontaminated sand. Immediately 
south of Minneapolis and St. Paul, however, it is 
contaminated with organic matter and other harmful 
substances. Yet, our rules frequently call for the same 
expensive on-land disposal of the dredge material 
regardless of specific circumstances. Environmental 
concerns and economic considerations must be more 
carefully balanced during the 80s. 
The St. Lawrence Seaway will require capacity 
expansion during the 80s. Midwestern agricultural 
interests must ensure that the Seawav and the locks 
on the Great Lakes do not become o~erly congested. 
There are two types of capacity constraints on the 
Seaway: winter closing of the shipping season; and 
the physical limits of channel depth, lock dimensions, 
and locking operations. 
The proposed two-week extension of the shipping 
season on the Seaway would provide a short-term 
capacity increase. A season extension on the Great 
Lakes, however, or even year-round navigation on the 
Upper Lakes, would be of little benefit to Upper Mid-
west agriculture unless the Seaway were also open 
longer. We need good transportation to international 
markets, not year-round access to Buffalo, New York 
(figure 1). The state of New York voices environ-
mental concerns over any major improvements on the 
Seaway, but probably opposes a longer season because 
of the potential loss of business to the Port of New 
York. This real or perceived loss of business would 
occur primarily in industrial and consumer cargo if 
steamship lines were able to establish reliable year-
round service to inland locations like Chicago. This 
would hurt well-established political constituencies 
such as the eastern longshoremen and overland trans-
portation companies. 
Capacity constraints due to physical dimensions 
will be even more difficult to solve. The channel 
depth of 27 feet is most limiting since newer ocean-
going vessels usually have a loaded draft well in excess 
of 30 feet. Deepening the channel to 30 feet, however, 
would have serious environmental impact on water 
levels, shorelines, and ecological systems throughout 
the Great Lakes basin. This capacity-increasing alter- -
native does not seem feasible in this century. 
Improved facility operation and incremental im-
provements to existing structures are expected to 
increase the existing facilities' throughput. Since the 
Seaway is binational and most of the critical bottle-
necks are in Canada, expansion may not occur as 
rapidly as we in the Midwest would like. 
In the other direction, the Columbia-Snake River 
waterway has become a very important outlet for 
wheat (figure 1). This became especially apparent 
during the 1979 strike at Duluth-Superior when wheat 
was trucked from North Dakota to the head of navi-
gation at Lewiston, Idaho. Total commerce on the 
Columbia-Snake system had increased 250 percent in 
the decade prior to 1979. 
The Bonneville Dam on the Columbia is the closest 
to the ocean, but is also the oldest, the smallest, and 
is approaching capacity. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers has indicated that qy the late 1980s the 
Bonneville Lock could be a major transportation 
bottleneck and has proposed construction of a replace-
ment lock. This proposal will undoubtedly generate 
an environmental controversy similar to that over 
Lock and Dam 26 with the possibility of added oppo-
sition from irrigation and hydroelectric interests. 
Roads-Keeping Up With the Trucks 
We need a strong infrastructure of roads and high- -
ways to get our products to locations where they can 
be processed or where rail or water can move them to 
export ports. However, we have a significant road and 
highway financing problem. We generally have not 
been building or rebuilding roads and highways as fast 
as we have been wearing them out. 
There are three interrelated and costly problems 
pertaining to our roads and highways. The first is the 
financial crisis as it relates to almost all levels of high-
ways from the interstate system to township roads. 
The second is the current status of our rural road 
system. The third is the relationship between heavier 
vehicles and increased highway wear. 
The financial situation. Highway construction and 
maintenance have probably been as hurt by the hidden 
cost of inflation as any other part of our economy. 
The costs of road construction and maintenance have 
increased much faster than inflation since 1973. 
The primary sources of funds for roads have tradi-
tionally been gasoline taxes, vehicle and operator 
licenses, and property tax revenues. Revenues from 
the gasoline tax and license fees do not increase with 
inflation. In fact, revenues from the gasoline tax, 
which historically accounted for 50 percent of our 
national highway and road spending, are now decreas-
ing absolutely as a result of our national goals of 
improving gas mileage and reducing driving. Federal A 
gasoline tax revenues were down 10 percent from the W 
previous year early in 1980 and it appeared that the 
downward trend would continue. 
) 
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Gasoline tax revenues are spent primarily on the 
interstate and primary road system. In 1972, the gas 
tax was 11 cents per gallon or about one-third the 
retail price. At that time, roughly, one-third of every 
dollar spent on gasoline went to construction and 
maintenance of highways. In early 1980, the tax rate 
was 13 cents per gallon, but only about 11 percent of 
every dollar spent on gasoline went to the road and 
highway system. The exemption of gasohol from 
federal and some state fuel taxes will only compound 
the revenue shortage. 
Status of rural roads. Our rural road system was 
built during the 1920s and 30s when the average farm 
was less than 200 acres and farm trucks had gross 
weights of 6 or 7 tons. In fact, 70 percent of U.S. 
rural bridges were constructed by 1935. About 50 
percent of all the U.S. rural roads were improved 
before 1950. 
Rural transportation needs have changed considera-
bly since the 1930s. Crop yields have ballooned, U.S. 
farm size has doubled, and our markets have shifted 
off the farm into national and international channels. 
Traffic characteristics have followed suit. Tandem-
axel trucks with gross weights of 23 tons have become 
common on rural roads. A farm tractor and two 
wagons loaded with soybeans can weigh up to 28 tons. 
These vehicles are traveling over bridges built when 
8 tons was considered a big load! 
Obviously we must maintain an adequate rural 
road system to cope with these changes. However, in 
many parts of the Upper Midwest, we have too many 
rural roads to maintain efficiently. We no longer need 
roads that were plotted at one-mile intervals to serve 
160-acre farms with horses. 
If we were to lay out a road system today, we could 
put roads two miles apart and still have better access 
to towns and markets than we had 60 years ago. If 
the excess roads were eliminated, the number of inter-
sections and grade crossings would be reduced and 
the remaining land could be farmed. The selection of 
roads to be abandoned will be a tough political pro-
cess, but bridge replacement needs will probably play 
a key role in these decisions. 
Heavier vehicles. The stress exerted on highway 
pavement increases as the fourth power of the axle 
load. Figure 2 illustrates this in terms of a single axle. 
Axle weight is on the bottom; the stress measure or 
damage factor is along the side. The graph shows that 
when axle weight increases from 18,000 pounds to 
20,000 pounds, stress from that axle increases by 
roughly 50 percent. An 80,000-pound truck weighs 
20 times as much as an automobile, but its combined 
axles cause 9,600 times as much stress on the pave-
ment and roadbed. 
Many states limit truck weights to 73,000 pounds. 
The federal government is pressuring such states to 
allow an 80,000-pound limit on the interstate high-
way system. The 7 ,000-pound increase would exert 
25 to 40 percent more stress per load. After adjusting 
for fewer trips to move the same amount of commod-
ity when the load is increased, total road stress will 
increase about 8 percent. A U.S. Department of Trans-
portation study concluded that a 10 percent increase 
in maximum truck weight would decrease fuel con-
sumption by 0.37 percent, but this might be offset by 
accelerated highway deterioration. If pavement deteri-
oration continues to exceed repavement efforts at 
current rates, vehicle fuel efficiency in 1985 could 
decrease by 2.4 percent. Fuel consumption at 40 miles 
per hour over badly patched asphalt increases 34 per-
cent over fuel consumption on high quality pavement. 
Poor road surface increases energy consumption for 
all vehicles, not just trucks. 
Truck operating costs, especially labor cost per unit 
handled, should decline due to increasing productivity 
if truck weight limits are increased. However, this 
increase would not be free. The taxpayer would foot 
the bill for higher road maintenance costs. 
One of the emerging issues of the 80s is whether 
large trucks "pay their way." License fees are much 
higher for trucks than cars, but trucks are responsible 
for most of the stress on our roads. It could be argued 
that from the 1920s through the 60s, the road system 
was being developed for general transportation. The 
system was going to be built whether or not trucks 
used it. Since the system was for everyone, commer-
cial vehicles paid the "incremental costs" of their use. 
The public paid right-of-way, basic construction, and 
other basic costs, while an additional charge was 
levied on trucks corresponding to the increased pave-
ment thickness and width they required. The validity 
of this system lessens as trucks get larger and autos 
get smaller. Now when highway improvements are 
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Figure 2. Damage level escalation due to added vehicle weight per axle* 
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*Source : Minnesota Department of Highways, Axle Loads: Effects on Highway, p. 2. 
made, maximum truck size determines required right-
of-way, grades, vertical and horizontal clearances, and 
structural considerations. The high clearances, wide 
turning radii, and easy grades of our best limited-
access highways are designed for commercial traffic, 
not personal travel. We can expect that the highway 
financing problems of the 1980s will cause these issues 
to be much more widely debated than in the past. 
Finally, most of the debate over higher truck 
weights has assumed that truckers generally load to 
their legal limit. If they load over the limit, the stress 
estimates would be much too low, as the steep curve 
on figure 2 indicates. A recent study by the Govern-
ment Accounting Office showed that heavy commod-
ities such as coal, steel, and grain were frequently 
loaded above the legal limit. When we consider how 
rapidly damage increases, it's obvious such loads are 
very destructive. And if some truckers run overweight 
consistently, it virtually becomes an economic neces-
sity for other truckers to follow suit. The solution is 
a better and more vigorous system of weight law 
enforcement. 
This research was funded by Cooperative Agreement Number 12-05-
300-417 between the University of Minnesota Agricultural Extension 
Service and SEA, Extension, USDA; and by the Title V Rural Develop· 
ment Act of 1972. 
SUMMARY 
An adequate transportation system for Upper Mid-
west agriculture in the 1980s will require : 
• A commitment by government and industry to re-
build our major rail routes to both the Gulf and 
the West Coast and to replace or consolidate obso-
lete yards and terminals in more advantageous 
locations; 
• Expedited construction of Lock and Dam 26; 
• Capacity-increasing improvements on the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway along with a season 
extension on the Seaway; 
• An increase in expenditures for maintenance on 
state and federal highways along with vigorous 
enforcement of vehicle weights; and 
• Some hard decisions about our rural road systems, 
since the costs of replacing obsolete rural bridges as 
well as the costs of road construction and mainte-
nance means we will probably have to abandon 
some rural roads. 
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